Surovikin’s Difficult Choice

Guest Post by Big Serge

In January, 1944, the newly reconstituted German Sixth Army found itself in an operationally cataclysmic situation in the southern bend of the Dnieper River, in the area of Krivoi Rog and Nikopol. The Germans occupied a dangerous salient, jutting out precariously into the Red Army’s lines. Vulnerable on two awkward flanks, and facing an enemy with superiority in manpower and firepower, any general worth his salt would have sought to withdraw as soon as possible. In this case, however, Hitler insisted that the Wehrmacht hold the salient, because the region was Germany’s last remaining source of manganese – a mineral crucial for making high quality steel.

A year prior, in the opening weeks of 1943, Hitler had intervened in another, more famous battle, forbidding the previous incarnation of the Sixth Army from breaking out of a pocket forming around it at Stalingrad. Prohibited from withdrawing, the Sixth was annihilated wholesale.

In both of these cases, there was a clash between pure military prudence and broader political aims and needs. In 1943, there was neither a compelling military nor political reason to keep the 6th Army in the pocket at Stalingrad – political intervention in military decision making was both senseless and disasterous. In 1944, however, Hitler (however difficult it is to admit it) had a valid argument. Without manganese from the Nikopol area, German war production was doomed. In this case, political intervention was perhaps warranted. Leaving an army in a vulnerable salient is bad, but so is running out of manganese.

These two tragic fates of the Sixth Army illustrate the salient issue today: how do we parse the difference between military and political decision making? More specifically, to what do we attribute the shocking Russian decision to withdraw from the west bank of the Dnieper in Kherson oblast, after annexing it just a few months ago?

I would like to parse through this issue. First off, one cannot deny that the withdrawal is politically a significant humiliation for Russia. The question becomes, however, whether this sacrifice was necessary on military or political grounds, and what it may signify about the future course of the conflict.

As I see it, the withdrawal from west bank Kherson must be driven by one of the four following possibilities:

  1. The Ukrainian Army has defeated the Russian Army on the west bank and driven it back across the river.
  2. Russia is setting a trap in Kherson.
  3. A secret peace agreement (or at least ceasefire) has been negotiated which includes giving Kherson back to Ukraine.
  4. Russia has made a politically embarrassing but militarily prudent operational choice.

Let us simply run through these four and examine them in sequence.

Possibility 1: Military Defeat

The recapture of Kherson is being fairly celebrated by Ukrainians as a victory. The question is just what kind of victory it is – political/optical, or military? It becomes trivially obvious that it is the first sort. Let’s examine a few facts.

First off, as recently as the morning of November 9 – hours before the withdrawal was announced – some Russian war correspondents were expressing skepticism about the withdrawal rumors because Russia’s forward defensive lines were completely intact. There was no semblance of crisis among Russian forces in the region.

Secondly, Ukraine was not executing any intense offensive efforts in the region at the time the withdrawal began, and Ukrainian officials expressed skepticism that the withdrawal was even real. Indeed, the idea that Russia was laying a trap originates with Ukrainian officials who were apparently caught off guard by the withdrawal. Ukraine was not prepared to pursue or exploit, and advanced cautiously into the void after Russian soldiers were gone. Even with Russia withdrawing, they were clearly scared to advance, because their last few attempts to push through the defenses in the area became mass casualty events.

Overall, Russia’s withdrawal was implemented very quickly with minimal pressure from the Ukrainians – this very fact is the basis of the idea that it is either a trap or the result of a backroom deal that’s been concluded. In either case, Russia simply slipped back across the river without pursuit by the Ukrainians, taking negligible losses and getting virtually all of their equipment out (so far, a broken down T90 is the only Ukrainian capture of note). The net score on the Kherson Front remains a strong casualty imbalance in favor of Russia, and they once again withdraw without suffering a battlefield defeat and with their forces intact.

Possibility 2: It’s a Trap

This theory cropped up very soon after the withdrawal was announced. It originated with Ukrainian officials who were caught off guard by the announcement, and was then picked up (ironically) by Russian supporters who were hoping that 4D chess was being played – it is not. Russia is playing standard 2D chess, which is the only kind of chess there is, but more about that later.

It’s unclear what exactly “trap” is supposed to mean, but I’ll try to fill in the blanks. There are two possible interpretations of this: 1) a conventional battlefield maneuver involving a timely counterattack, and 2) some sort of unconventional move like a tactical nuclear weapon or a cascading dam failure.

It’s clear that there’s no battlefield counter in the offing, for the simple reason that Russia blew the bridges behind them. With no Russian forces left on the west bank and the bridges wrecked, there is no immediate capacity for either army to attack the other in force. Of course, they can shell each other across the river, but the actual line of contact is frozen for the time being.

That leaves the possibility that Russia intends to do something unconventional, like use a low yield nuke.

The idea that Russia lured Ukraine into Kherson to set off a nuke is… stupid.

If Russia wanted to use a nuclear weapon against Ukraine (which they don’t, for reasons I articulated in a previous article) there’s no sensible reason why they would choose a regional capital that they annexed as the site to do it. Russia has no shortage of delivery systems. If they wanted to nuke Ukraine, very simply, they wouldn’t bother abandoning their own city and making that the blast site. They would simply nuke Ukraine. It’s not a trap.

Possibility 3: Secret Deal

This was sparked by the news that US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan has been in contact with his Russian counterpart, and specifically the sense that the White House has been pushing for the negotiations. Under one rumored variant of the “Sullivan Deal”, Ukraine would acknowledge Russia’s annexations east of the Dnieper, while west bank Kherson would revert back to Kiev’s control.

I find this unlikely for a variety of reasons. First off, such a deal would represent an extremely pyrrhic Russian victory – while it would achieve the liberation of the Donbas (one of the explicit goals of the SMO) it would leave Ukraine largely intact and strong enough to be a perennial thorn in the side, as an inimical anti-Russian state. There would be the problem of probable further Ukrainian integration into NATO, and above all, the open surrender of an annexed regional capital.

On the Ukrainian side, the issue is that the recovery of Kherson only enhances the (false) perception in Kiev that total victory is possible, and that Crimea and the Donbas can be recovered entirely. Ukraine is enjoying a string of territorial advances, and feels that it is pushing its window of opportunity.

Ultimate, there seems to be no deal that satisfies both sides, and this reflects that the innate hostility between the two nations must be resolved on the battlefield. Only Ares can adjudicate this dispute.

As for Ares, he has been hard at work in Pavlovka.

While the world was fixated on the relatively bloodless change of hands in Kherson, Russia and Ukraine fought a bloody battle for Pavlovka, and Russia won. Ukraine also attempted to break Russia’s defenses in the Svatove axis, and was repulsed with heavy casualties. Ultimately, the main reason to doubt news of a secret deal is the fact that the war is continuing on all the other fronts – and Ukraine is losing. This leaves only one option.

Possibility 4: A Difficult Operational Choice

This withdrawal was subtly signaled shortly after General Surovikin was put in charge of the operation in Ukraine. In his first press conference, he signaled dissatisfaction with the Kherson front, calling the situation “tense and difficult” and alluding to the threat of Ukraine blowing dams on the Dnieper and flooding the area. Shortly thereafter, the process of evacuating civilians from Kherson began.

Here is what I think Surovikin decided about Kherson.

Kherson was becoming an inefficient front for Russia because of the logistical strain of supplying forces across the river with limited bridge and road capacity. Russia demonstrated that it was capable of shouldering this sustainment burden (keeping troops supplied all through Ukraine’s summer offensives), but the question becomes 1) to what purpose, and 2) for how long.

Ideally, the bridgehead becomes the launching point for offensive action against Nikolayev, but launching an offensive would require strengthening the force grouping in Kherson, which correspondingly raises the logistical burden of projecting force across the river. With a very long front to play with, Kherson is clearly one of the most logistically intensive axes. My guess is that Surovikin took charge and almost immediately decided he did not want to increase the sustainment burden by trying to push on Nikolayev.

Therefore, if an offensive is not going to be launched from the Kherson position, the question becomes – why hold the position at all? Politically, it is important to defend a regional capital, but militarily the position becomes meaningless if one is not going to go on the offensive in the south.

Let’s be even more explicit: unless an offensive towards Nikolayev is planned, the Kherson bridgehead is militarily counterproductive.

While holding the bridgehead in Kherson, the Dnieper River becomes a negative force multiplier – increasing the sustainment and logistics burden and ever threatening to leave forces cut off if Ukraine succeeds in destroying the bridges or bursting the dam. Projecting force across the river becomes a heavy burden with no obvious benefit. But by withdrawing to the east bank, the river becomes a positive force multiplier by serving as a defensive barrier.

In the broader operational sense, Surovikin seems to be declining battle in the south while preparing in the north and in the Donbas. It is clear that he made this decision shortly after taking command of the operation – he has been hinting at it for weeks, and the speed and cleanliness of the withdrawal suggests that it was well planned , long in advance. Withdrawing across the river increases the combat effectiveness of the army significantly and decreases the logistical burden, freeing resources for other sectors.

This fits the overall Russian pattern of making harsh choices about resource allocation, fighting this war under the simple framework of optimizing the loss ratios and building the perfect meatgrinder. Unlike the German Army in the second world war, the Russian army seems to be freed from political interference to make rational military decisions.

In this way, the withdrawal from Kherson can be seen as a sort of anti-Stalingrad. Instead of political interference hamstringing the military, we have the military freed to make operational choices even at the cost of embarrassing the political figures. And this, ultimately, is the more intelligent – if optically humiliating – way to fight a war.

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anon a moos
anon a moos

Only the west thinks in terms of optics and propaganda narratives more than actually achieving goals.

I think this assessment is pretty accurate and time will bear this out, or not.

Diogenes' Dung
Diogenes' Dung

The west needs optics and propaganda (O&P) to achieve its goals, because its goals are antithetical to western civilization.

Optics and propaganda are the odorless, colorless exhaust from DC that will soon completely suffocate the goals of the middle class. Upward mobility, already in its death throes, will be celebrated as a rosy red complexion on our death mask instead of propaganda poisoning.

The CoVid O&P had many goals – liberty lockdowns, small business destruction, criminalized worship, retarded education, elevating superstition as science and hypocrisy as enlightened governance.

Every goal of the west’s O&P has been achieved but they clearly have much worse in store for our collective of mush-mind minions. Why not? We’ve proven we’ll eat their O&P for breakfast, lunch and dinner, and beg for moar.

That assessment is already baked into our turd cake.

MartelsHammer
MartelsHammer

A simple question that nobody here who hates the filthy Jews (and who doesn’t!) along with their own country, can’t seem to answer……If Russia is winning, how come they do nothing but retreat?

ken31
ken31

All these analysts fail to appreciate how many assumptions they make.

The Central Scrutinizer
The Central Scrutinizer

I truly believe everyone does. It’s hard wired from birth. Life would not be possible without them. Assumptions…not analysts.

anon a moos
anon a moos

Meanwhile Lithuania moves troops into the Ukraine. and nary a peep from the MSM. odd.

Iggy
Iggy

It’s gonna get real cold out there on the ukrainian steppe.

tony
tony

but the bombs and missiles will warm things up a bit.

Iska Waran
Iska Waran

I hope the Lithuanians are the first to go. Delusional fuckers.

Defector
Defector

Not all of us.
Lithuania has unfortunately become a Petri dish for WEF.
The gubbermint?
If it is possible to rig the US elections, then rigging ours is a walk in the park.

Defector
Defector

I am Lithuanian.
Heard nothing of that.
Will investigate.
If correct, sounds alarming to me.

Defector
Defector

Would be grateful for the source revealed.

Gryf
Gryf

From Tolstoi’s War and Peace, a Russian mantra: “Time and Patience”.

Hank
Hank

After watching the fighting unfold in Ukraine I’ve come to one conclusion. Just as the aircraft carrier made the battleship obsolete so too are attack helicopters and tanks. Helicopters fly low and slow making them easy targets for MANPADs (man portable air defense missiles) and tanks are slow lumbering targets for the latest man portable anti-tank missiles like the NLAW.

It’s bad enough to lose a multi-million dollar weapons platform to some kid with a $40,000 missile launcher. But you also lose a highly trained crew.

Tanks and helos are great for asymmetric warfare. But when fighting near-peers, they become death traps.

I expect few military planners are willing to admit this. The next war is always fought with the tools and tactics of the last war.

m
m

Yeah, those overwhelming numbers of successful Stinger and Javelin hits totally confirm you.

Ginger
Ginger

This is the future of warfare. John Clancy wrote about this forty years ago.

Iggy
Iggy

Nuke Tel Aviv,London ,Brussels and DC ? Not to much of a decision there.

The Central Scrutinizer
The Central Scrutinizer

How’s about we start by blowing Mecca off the map. You’d be surprised what blessings would come from that.

TampaRed
TampaRed

why do you suggest committing violence against the religion of peace?

B_MC
B_MC

Comment from the article linked below….

Russian soldiers left a message for Ukrainians in Kherson:

Dear Ukrainians, please behave while we’re gone.
Don’t forget you’re on the territory of the Russian Empire!

We’re on a vacation and we’ll be back soon.
1. Don’t bite the furniture
2. Don’t shit on the floor
3. Don’t disturb the bystanders
4. Don’t bark at night
5. Make sure the doors stay closed, the winds are harsh!
6. We suggest you tidy your rooms while we’re gone.
Each room has a portrait of our president V.V.Putin, make sure to kiss it!
We’ll come to check on you!

PS. Make sure you kiss the flag and sing the anthem of the Russian Federation each morning!!

With love, special forces of the Russian Federation!

comment image

https://smoothiex12.blogspot.com/2022/11/speaking-of-planes-larry-beat-me-to-it.html

Anonymous
Anonymous
The boogieman
The boogieman
Iggy
Iggy

You should show the WW 2 planes crashing into each other in Texas to show our pilots lol.

Iggy
Iggy

It seems our planes are no where close to this in maneuverability,and with all the Chinese chips and components in our planes they seem to fall out of the sky for no reason lol.

TampaRed
TampaRed

i sent this to a buddy of mine who is a pilot to ask if i should be impressed by this–here is his reply–

“That’s just thrust vectoring, of which our planes are very capable. While it looks cool in airshows, I don’t know how practical it is. Dogfights are incredibly rare. The last two involving US aircraft were:
– 2017 US Navy F/A-18E shot down a SU-22 (Syria)
– 1999 5 MIG-29s were shot down by F-15s and F-16s (Kosovo)

The F-22 is by far the most maneuverable stealth tactical fighter in the world, very BVR capable, and cannot be sold to other countries.

The F-35 is the world’s most technically advanced fighter. While slower and less maneuverable than the 22, it can accept sensor data from and coordinate the activity of multiple fighters and drones.
No one else has anything like it. It’s a fast maneuverable command center.

and we actually produce our aircraft, as opposed to the Russians that build a few and try to keep them running (though a high percentage of our are also out of service at any given time).

Even the F-15 has over 100 wins and no air-to-air losses.

BTW – I was one of two civilians (other than the Civil Air Patrol) invited to fly their aircraft into the
MacDill AirFest airshow this year. It was the first time I’ve ever been warned by the tower to watch out for the arrest cable.
By chance had lunch with the F-22 pilot and a bunch of F15 and F18 pilots. I was surprised to learn that the guy in the back isn’t even a pilot. He’s solely responsible for situational awareness, comms, and some tech management. If something happens to the pilot, he’s to pull the red handle. “

The boogieman
The boogieman
m
m

Give them a warm welcome!

Iggy
Iggy

I think we’re in deep shit.

Iggy
Iggy

There’s a supposed de classified document on rense advising Jews on how to avoid military service and that they should profit from war and deceive the goyim.

Martin
Martin

Good chance Russia is now unable to defend its border with China. What are the chances millions of Eastern Russians who look more Chinese than European are thinking of switching allegiance ? China should be thinking ‘forget Taiwan, go North – that is where the resources are.’ ..

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