Submitted by Steve
In a military campaign, like the invasions of Saddam’s Iraq in 1991 and 2003, there is designated a main effort, and a set of supporting efforts. The main effort is the constructive centerline of the strategy, the one on which the momentum may accelerate or slow, but is always propelling the campaign most directly toward the its objective (e.g., to reach Baghdad with massed force and reduce Iraq’s national authorities to disorganized impotence, so that there is no longer any focused national will).
The supporting efforts contribute to the main effort, affording it what it needs in terms of strength, protection, breathing space, acceleration, and preparation for follow-through, including the need to move on to a next phase. In some cases supporting efforts are maneuver vectors in their own right, such as flanking moves to complicate the enemy’s battle problem geographically. In other cases they may be well-designed logistic activities, political gambits, or campaigns in warfare dimensions like information or strategic interdiction; e.g., eliminating the infrastructure for producing war materiel.
