What’s really going on in Ukraine

Guest Post by Johan Eddebo

Background

Ukraine is historically a part of the Russian heartland. Going all the way back to Russia’s progenitor state of Kievan Rus of the 10th century, founded by the Rurikid dynasty originating among Swedish vikings, Ukraine has been a part of, or closely connected to, the continuous political entity that we now call “Russia”.

Sure, there were periods where statelets on the contemporary Ukrainian territory were independent from formal Russian control, e.g. the Grand Principality of Kiev was under Lithuania for a century, a suzerain of the Golden Horde for a while, and there were various tribes occupying the contemporary territory in what’s a rather complex history.

However, what’s now Ukraine was really never outside of “Russian” hegemony and culture since the 1000s, and was formally a part of the Russian Empire since the 18th century.

This is not to say that Russia prima facie “has a right” to the territory in any legal or moral sense, my point here is just that they in many ways are intimately connected, and until very recently actually were part of the same political entity.

Ukraine’s sigificance to Russian security

Ukraine became formally independent about 30 years ago, in relation to the dissolution of the USSR. Strategically, Ukraine is indispensable for Russian security.

One aspect of this is the Black Sea region and Crimea, the importance of which was the key reason for Florence Nightingale’s Crimean War of the 1800s.

Sevastopol has been Russia’s predominant warm water port since 1783 (meaning it’s viable year-round) and is the only avenue for power projection through the Mediterranean, affording the only really viable access to the Middle East, as well as the South Atlantic and Indian Ocean.

Crimea also provides Russia with operational capacity in its close vicinity, e.g. for regional troop transportation and protection of its key trade routes passing through the Black Sea, and is vital for Russia’s strategic defence capabilities of the entire southern flank.

Read more here.

While not entirely defenceless, Russia would be very vulnerable if it lost just Crimea.

Moreover, Ukraine as such is geostrategically vital for a number of other reasons as well. It was the second-most important Soviet Socialist Republic not only due to its resources, population and productive capacities, but also since it’s basically a stone’s throw from the very heart of Russia. Take and hold Ukraine and you can just march into Moscow. Or starve it.

Look up the French, Swedish and German invasions of Russia for comparison. Sweden was routed at Poltava, Napoleon managed to burn Moscow to the ground but had to retreat. Hitler, however, seized Ukraine at the outset of Operation Barbarossa and did quite a bit of damage. The Ukrainan SSR was that yellow glob on the left:

Today, a key aspect of the situation is the fact that most gas exported by Russia passes through the Ukraine network. This comprises a significant portion of Russia’s trade surplus, and the fact that Europe in turn is arguably dependent upon this resource flow is also an important background factor.

Still, petroleum looms in the background as always.

Russia exports almost as much as Saudi Arabia and is the no. 2 global producer. What’s more, its reserves are unexploited to a greater extent than those of almost any other significant producer, and arguably provides access to petroleum at a higher EROI than anywhere else in the world.

I have written about the resource situation elsewhere, but to summarize, the West needs unimpeded access to this petroleum, at least in the mid-term, or it’s a sitting duck, incapable of staving off immediate decline.

The Present Day

Basically, Ukraine has been targeted by the West for “regime change” since at least the “Orange Revolution” of 2004 which was a creation of the NGO racket and Western intelligence, ousting the pro-Russian Victor Yanukovych.

The succeeding Tymoshenko government privatized state assets and vocally supported NATO membership to “protect Ukraine from Russian aggression”.

Things went back and forth for a while with Yanukovych as opposition leader, after which he was elected to the presidency in 2010 and played a chief role in shaping the succeeding two governments.

Then we of course end up with the US-backed coup in 2014, the “Revolution of Dignity”, according to Wikipedia. The purpose of this coup was to absorb Ukraine into the EU, indirectly rendering it a NATO asset, and of course reducing its utility as a Russian market.

When Yanukovych, in late 2013 or early 2014, appeared to be closing the door to this integration through an agreement with Russia, Ukraine “got couped”, its government overthrown, and an armed insurgency was instigated and supported by the West. [Read our detailed timeline of this here – ed.]

In view of the background factors, the West had few other options, of course. Especially in relation to Russia’s efforts at creating a Eurasian Union of which Ukraine would be fundamental, challenging the hegemony of the West, establishing common energy markets that could easily kill the petrodollar.

In wake of the coup, Russia then responded by securing its assets on Crimea through supporting the secession, as well as to some extent that of Luhansk and Donetsk, yet which were not formally recognized by Russia until just a few days ago. This ushered in the eight-year war in Donbas between the Ukrainian government and the secessionists.

Early on, the Minsk agreements were implemented, with the purpose of establishing a cease-fire and reintegrating Luhansk & Donetsk into Ukraine, while granting them a certain measure of autonomy.

These were signed yet never fully implemented, and according to the Russian administration, increasingly violated by a slowly collapsing Ukrainian state, reduced to a colony with a puppet regime, also citing a ramp-up in attacks on the civilian population of the semi-independent regions.

Here’s the gist of the Kremlin’s perspective on the current situation:

All of this eventually led up to a Russian ultimatum, given in December 2021, pertaining to the security issues mentioned in the quotation above, as well as to NATO agreeing to refrain from formal expansion, termed “aggressive proposals” in the linked Guardian article.

The Saker gives another perspective:

Russia politely requested that NATO confine its activities to its location as of 1997, and keep out of the former Warsaw Pact territory. This was to abide by the promises that the United States made to the Soviet Union at the time that the Soviets agreed to disband the Warsaw Pact. Both the United States and NATO responded negatively to the initiative, but agreed to hold negotiations with Russia during the week of January 11-14, 2022
The Saker, The Not Ultimatum 14/1/2022

This ultimatum was finally (predictably) rejected:

Which was followed by an escalation from the Ukrainian/NATO-side in the Donbas War, after which Russia formally recognized the seceding republics and signed treaties for co-operation with both.

After this formal recognition was ratified by the Duma, the Russian administration issued an ultimatum to Kiev to cease aggression against the newly-recognized republics, swear off NATO membership, and demilitarize. DNR and LNR officials likewise demanded the evacuation of Ukranian troops from their respective territories.

When Kiev inevitably refused, Russia embarked on the ongoing military operation against Ukraine.

What’s next?

The Ukranian defence capabilities seem to be more or less neutralized after a day and a half of war. The air force and navy is basically knocked out, as is the air defence, rendering what remains of the ground forces without support, and probably very little cohesion.

Kiev is encircled and about to fall, as are many major cities and population centers. The Ukrainian defence will likely be enveloped in days, hopefully implying some possibility of a short conflict.

But in reality, we’re probably looking at something reminiscent of the aftermath of the Iraq war. Russia will most likely make short work of the regular forces and bring about a regime change, sure, but it seems almost inevitable that whatever then becomes of Ukraine will have to contend with a protracted conflict against a stay-behind insurgency supported by NATO.

Indeed, as Pål Steigan says regarding the overarching conflict, which I must agree to in light of the resource situation and the general state of the global economy:

This war will not stop until Russia is conquered and divided, or has put an end to the US offensive.”

In this first hot conflict of the Great Reset, we see the first open challenge to Western hegemony in generations. But the most important aspect of the conflict will likely take place within the economic realm. How long, for instance, will an energy-starved Europe maintain support for US foreign policy priorities?

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