THE INSANITY OF SELF-SUBJUGATION

The difference voting makes: let’s see(democrats )1.in favor of homosexuality , abortion on demand , gun control , progressive taxation , affirmative action , unlimited immigration , a godless nation and in general the subversion of America into a totalitarian fascist nation complete with total surveillance of the population by the NSA.

My dear Stucky .Do you see ?Voting does make a difference. When conservatives stay home we end up with the Obamas of the world.

Stucky ,amen brother

Dill head ,I never said I was a republican. I simply said voting matters. Did your bang you head against the wall like suggested?

bb,this vid has strong language content .Don’t watch until little bb has gone to bed.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=igbBItLemsM

@dc, nicely done.

Propaganda and lies disguised as education is truly, really, unequivocally, effective, no?

bb…for you and little bb’s entertainment .

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/NoOverlord/index.html

OVERLORD: The Unnecessary Invasion

By

William F. Moore
Lieutenant Colonel, USA

A research report submitted to the faculty
in
fulfillment of the research
requirement

Research Advisor: Dr. Joseph L. Strange

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama
March 1986

CONCLUSION

The massive allied invasion of Normandy in June 1944 was not necessary for the military defeat of Germany. The German Army had already been destroyed on the eastern front, and the German war industry was being devastated by the combined bombing offensive. According to Trumbull Higgins,

When the British were finally compelled by their Allies to invade France in 1944, it was an invasion essentially undertaken in the self-interest of the West, the terrible risk of the collapse of the Soviet Union having long since passed. At this date the Red Army no longer needed more than Western supplies with which to occupy eastern Europe. (4:283)

The Normandy invasion was simply too late to be of meaningful assistance to the Russians. In fact, Stalin had conceded that is was no longer necessary.

Furthermore, many capable allied strategists knew that OVERLORD was no longer required and recommended against it. Why were these recommendations not heeded, especially since they would have resulted in greatly reduced British and American casualties? Two considerations cannot be ignored. First was the sheer momentum behind the OVERLORD planning. American planners had placed all their European “eggs” in this basket, they had been advocating OVERLORD against the British for over two years, and they were unwilling to concede to the British position in late 1943. Secondly, American leaders, including Roosevelt, felt that unless American forces took a significant (albeit late) share in defeating the German Army, the Russians would be entirely uncooperative in the post-war world and probably would

–35–

not assist in defeating the Japanese. The British were much less concerned about Russian sensitivities, feeling instead that their post-war interests would be better served by strengthening and conserving their armed forces rather than squandering them on the beaches of Normandy.

OVERLORD was not a military necessity; it was an unnecessary military gamble that could easily have failed. In retrospect, it is impossible to understand why American strategists were so committed to it. This commitment itself is evidence of serious strategic inflexibility. American planners either could not or would not adjust to the realities of the European theater in late 1943 and early 1944. Having already made the investment in a strategic bombing force that, in combination with the Russian Army, could have defeated Germany in a matter of months, why did the US not unleash the bombers and turn its attention to the Pacific theater? Why did US strategists not accept British recommendations for a less risky Mediterranean/Balkan strategy that would have left the western forces in a much more favorable post-war position relative to the Russians? The answers to these questions have political as well as military dimensions. President Roosevelt believed he could buy Stalin’s post-war cooperation. When Stalin expressed his final preference for OVERLORD at Tehran, he essentially allowed American political and military strategy to coalesce. OVERLORD was what the Russians still wanted and it was what Gen Marshall had always wanted. Roosevelt could not have been more pleased.

–36–

In the final analysis, parochialism cannot be discounted. During World War I American leaders and forces had chafed under the constraints of a strategy developed by Britain. With World War II, America had another opportunity to assert its world leadership role and develop the strategy for victory. Gen Marshall was entirely consistent with the attitudes of the American people and their political leaders when he insisted that OVERLORD, the American plan, would be used to defeat Germany. Furthermore, and perhaps even more important to Gen Marshall, he knew that victory in the Pacific theater would be achieved primarily by Naval and Air forces. Geography alone dictated this. OVERLORD was the last opportunity for the US Army to play a major a rather than a peripheral role in the victory. General Marshall simply would not let such an opportunity pass.

The argument that the two parties should represent opposed ideals and policies, one, perhaps, of the Right and the other of the Left, is a foolish idea acceptable only to the doctrinaire and academic thinkers. Instead, the two parties should be almost identical, so that the American people can “throw the rascals out” at any election without leading to any profound or extreme shifts in policy.

– Carrol Quigley,