First, some truly wonderful Russian war porn. (I love Putin’s “HOORAH!” at the beginning!)
https://youtu.be/I5ZKivBYQYM
I recall at the very beginning of the war a bunch of CNN douchebag retards mocking the Russian missile salvos …. that they were miniscule and pathetic when compared to ‘Murika’s “shock & awe” in Iraq. And, that right there, explains America’s total failure in this war; Americentrism. By that made-up word I mean our military leader’s myopic view that The American Way is the ONLY way. We don’t even make the smallest of attempts to understand ANYTHING (war, politics, economics, etc) from The Other’s point of view. According to Sun Tzu this is why we’ve lost every war since WWII, and why we will lose in Ukraine, and why we will lose future wars. We are led by dumbfuk morans.
You are about to read one of the most intelligent analysis of Russian War Doctrine ever. According to the owner of the blog https://www.imetatronink.com where this appeared it was written by an anonymous contributor named “Marinus“, and appeared in the August 2022 issue of Marine Corps Gazette It caused quite a ruckus! It is believed that Marinus — “is none other that USMC Lt. Gen. (ret) Paul K. Van Riper, a long-revered champion of many Marines, and a prominent proponent of the so-called “Maneuverists” – a school of military thought strongly influenced by the work of the incomparable military strategist John R. Boyd.” Well, here a go … ENJOY!!!
============================== =
The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. Maneuverist Paper No. 22: Part II: The mental and moral realms
by Marinus
When considered as purely physical phenomena, the operations conducted by Russian ground forces in Ukraine in 2022 present a puzzling picture. In the north of Ukraine, Russian battalion tactical groups overran a great deal of territory but made no attempts to convert temporary occupation into permanent possession. Indeed, after spending five weeks in that region, they left as rapidly as they had arrived. In the south, the similarly rapid entry of Russian ground forces led to the establishment of Russian garrisons and the planting of Russian political, economic, and cultural institutions. In the third theater of the war, rapid movements of the type that characterized Russian operations on the northern and southern fronts rarely occurred. Instead, Russian formations in eastern Ukraine conducted artillery-intensive assaults to capture relatively small pieces of ground.
One way to shed a little light upon this conundrum is to treat Russian operations on each of the three major fronts of the war as a distinct campaign. Further illumination is provided by the realization that each of these campaigns followed a model that had been part of the Russian operational repertoire for a very long time. Such a scheme, however, fails to explain why the Russian leadership applied particular models to particular sets of operations. Resolving that question requires an examination of the mental and moral purposes served by each of these three campaigns.
Raids in the North
American Marines have long used the term “raid” to describe an enterprise in which a small force moves swiftly to a particular location, completes a discrete mission, and withdraws as quickly as it can. [1] To Russian soldiers, however, the linguistic cousin of that word (reyd) carries a somewhat different meaning. Where the travel performed by the team conducting a raid is nothing more than a means of reaching particular points on the map, the movement of the frequently larger forces conducting a reyd creates significant operational effects. That is, in the course of moving along various highways and byways, they confuse enemy commanders, disrupt enemy logistics, and deprive enemy governments of the legitimacy that comes from uncontested control of their own territory. Similarly, where each phase of a present-day American raid necessarily follows a detailed script, a reyd is a more open-ended enterprise that can be adjusted to exploit new opportunities, avoid new dangers, or serve new purposes.
The term reyd found its way into the Russian military lexicon in the late 19th century by theorists who noted the similarities between the independent cavalry operations of the American Civil War and the already well-established Russian practice of sending mobile columns, often composed of Cossacks, on extended excursions through enemy territory. [2] An early example of such excursions is provided by the exploits of the column led by Alexander Chernyshev during the Napoleonic Wars. In September of 1813, this force of some 2,300 horsemen and two light field guns made a 400-mile circuit through enemy territory. At the middle point of this bold enterprise, this column occupied, for two days, the city of Kassel, then serving as the capital of one of the satellite states of the French Empire. Fear of a repetition of this embarrassment convinced Napoleon to detail two army corps to garrison Dresden, then the seat of government of another one of his dependencies. [3] As a result, when Napoleon encountered the combined forces of his enemies at the Battle of Leipzig, his already outnumbered Grande Armée was much smaller than it would otherwise have been.
In 2022, the many battalion tactical groups that moved deeply into northern Ukraine during the first few days of the Russian invasion made no attempt to re-enact the occupation of Leipzig. Rather, they bypassed all of the larger cities in their path and, on the rare occasions when they found themselves in a smaller city, occupation rarely lasted for more than a few hours. Nonetheless, the fast-moving Russian columns created, on a much a larger scale, an effect similar to the one that resulted from Chernyshev’s raid of 1813. That is, they convinced the Ukrainians to weaken their main field army, then fighting in the Donbass region, to bolster the defenses of distant cities.
Rapid Occupation in the South
In terms of speed and distance traveled, Russian operations in the area between the southern seacoast of Ukraine and the Dnipro River resembled the raids conducted in the north. They differed, however, in the handling of cities. Where Russian columns on either side of Kyiv avoided large urban areas whenever they could, their counterparts in the south took permanent possession of comparable cities. In some instances, such as the ship-to-objective maneuver that began in the Sea of Azov and ended in Melitopol, the conquest of cities took place during the first few days of the Russian invasion. In others, such as the town of Skadovsk, the Russians waited several weeks before seizing areas and engaging local defense forces they had ignored during their initial advance.
In the immediate aftermath of their arrival, the Russian commanders who took charge of urban areas in the south followed the same policy as their counterparts in the north. That is, they allowed the local representatives of the Ukrainian state to perform their duties and, in many instances, to continue to fly the flag of their country on public buildings. [4] It was not long, however, before Russian civil servants took control of the local government, replaced the flags on buildings, and set in motion the replacement of Ukrainian institutions, whether banks or cell phone companies, with Russian ones. [5]
Like the model of the reyd, the paradigm of campaigns that combined rapid military occupation with thoroughgoing political transformation, had been part of the Russian military culture for quite some time. Thus, when explaining the concept for operations on the southern front, Russian commanders were able to point to any one of a number of similar enterprises conducted by the Soviet state in the four decades that followed Soviet occupation of eastern Poland in 1939. (These included the conquest of the countries of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in 1940; the suppression of reformist governments in Hungary and Czechoslovakia during the Cold War, and the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.) [6]
While some Russian formations in the south consolidated control over conquered territory, others conducted raids in the vicinity of the city of Mykolaiv. Like their larger counter-parts on the northern front, these encouraged the Ukrainian leadership to devote to the defense of cities forces that might otherwise have been used in the fight for the Donbass region. (In this instance, the cities in question included the ports of Mykolaiv and Odessa.) At the same time, the raids in the northern portion of the southern front created a broad “no man’s land” between areas that had been occupied by Russian forces and those entirely under the control of the Ukrainian government.
Stalingrad in the East
Russian operations in the north and south of Ukraine made very little use of field artillery. This was partially a matter of logistics. (Whether raiding in the north or rapidly occupying in the south, the Russian columns lacked the means to bring up large numbers of shells and rockets.) The absence of cannonades in those campaigns, however, had more to do with ends than means. In the north, Russian reluctance to conduct bombardments stemmed from a desire to avoid antagonizing the local people, nearly all of whom, for reasons of language and ethnicity, tended to support the Ukrainian state. In the south, the Russian policy of avoiding the use of field artillery served a similarly political purpose of preserving the lives and property of communities in which many people identified as “Russian” and many more spoke Russian as their native language.
In the east, however, the Russians conducted bombardments that, in terms of both duration and intensity, rivaled those of the great artillery contests of the world wars of the twentieth century. Made possible by short, secure, and extraordinarily redundant supply lines, these bombardments served three purposes. First, they confined Ukrainian troops into their fortifications, depriving them of the ability to do anything other than remain in place. Second, they inflicted a large number of casualties, whether physical or caused by the psychological effects of imprisonment, impotence, and proximity to large numbers of earth-shaking explosions. Third, when conducted for a sufficient period of time, which was often measured in weeks, the bombardment of a given fortification invariably resulted in either the withdrawal of its defenders or their surrender.
We can glean some sense of the scale of the Russian bombardments in the east of Ukraine by comparing the struggle for the town of Popasna (18 March – 7 May 2022) with the battle of Iwo Jima (19 February – 26 March 1945.) At Iwo Jima, American Marines fought for five weeks to annihilate the defenders of eight square miles of skillfully fortified ground. At Popasna, Russian gunners bombarded trench systems built into the ridges and ravines of a comparable area for eight weeks before the Ukrainian leadership decided to withdraw its forces from the town.
The capture of real estate by artillery, in turn, contributed to the creation of the encirclements that Russians call “cauldrons” (kotly). Like so much in Russian military theory, this concept builds upon an idea borrowed from the German tradition of maneuver warfare: the “battle cauldron” (Schlachtkessel). However, where the Germans sought to create and exploit their cauldrons as quickly as possible, Russian cauldrons could be either rapid and surprising or slow and seemingly inevitable. Indeed, the successful Soviet offensives of the Second World War, such as the one that resulted in the destruction of the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad, made extensive use of cauldrons of both types.
Freedom from the desire to create cauldrons as quickly as possible relieved the Russians fighting in eastern Ukraine from the need to hold any particular piece of ground. Thus, when faced with a determined Ukrainian attack, the Russians often withdrew their tank and infantry units from the contested terrain. In this way, they both reduced danger to their own troops and created situations, however brief, in which the Ukrainian attackers faced Russian shells and rockets without the benefit of shelter. To put things another way, the Russians viewed such “encore bombardments” not merely as an acceptable use of ordnance but also as opportunities to inflict additional casualties while engaging in “conspicuous consumption” of artillery ammunition.
In the spring of 1917, German forces on the Western Front used comparable tactics to create situations in which French troops advancing down the rear slopes of recently captured ridges were caught in the open by the fire of field artillery and machine guns. The effect of this experience on French morale was such that infantrymen in fifty French divisions engaged in acts of “collective indiscipline,” the motto for which was, “we will hold, but we refuse to attack.” [7] (In May of 2022, several videos appeared on the internet in which people claiming to be Ukrainian soldiers fighting in the Donbass region explained that, while they were willing to defend their positions, they had resolved to disobey any orders that called for them to advance.)
Resolving the Paradox
In the early days of the maneuver warfare debate, maneuverists often presented their preferred philosophy as the logical opposite of “firepower/attrition warfare.” Indeed, as late as 2013, the anonymous authors of the “Attritionist Letters” used this dichotomy as a framework for their critique of practices at odds with the spirit of maneuver warfare. In the Russian campaigns in Ukraine, however, a set of operations made mostly of movement complemented one composed chiefly of cannonades.
One way to resolve this apparent paradox is to characterize the raids of the first five weeks of the war as a grand deception that, while working little in the way of direct destruction, made possible the subsequent attrition of the Ukrainian armed forces. In particular, the threat posed by the raids delayed the movement of Ukrainian forces in the main theater of the war until the Russians had deployed the artillery units, secured the transporting network, and accumulated the stocks of ammunition needed to conduct a long series of big bombardments. This delay also ensured that, when the Ukrainians did deploy additional formations to the Donbass region, the movement of such forces, and the supplies needed to sustain them, had been rendered much more difficult by the ruin wrought upon the Ukrainian rail network by long-range guided missiles. In other words, the Russians conducted a brief campaign of maneuver in the north in order to set the stage for a longer, and, ultimately, more important campaign of attrition in the east.
The stark contrast between the types of warfare waged by Russian forces in different parts of Ukraine reinforced the message at the heart of Russian information operations. From the start, Russian propaganda insisted that the “special military operation” in Ukraine served three purposes: the protection of the two pro-Russian proto-states, “demilitarization,” and “denazification.” All three of these goals required the infliction of heavy losses upon Ukrainian formations fighting in the Donbass. None, however, depended upon the occupation of parts of Ukraine where the vast majority of people spoke the Ukrainian language, embraced a Ukrainian ethnic identity, and supported the Ukrainian state. Indeed, the sustained occupation of such places by Russian forces would have supported the proposition that Russia was trying to conquer all of Ukraine.
The Russian campaign in the south served direct political aims. That is, it served to incorporate territories inhabited by a large number of ethnic Russians into the “Russian World.” At the same time, the rapid occupation of cities like Kherson and Melitopol enhanced the deceptive power of operations conducted in the north by suggesting the possibility that the columns on either side of Kyiv might attempt to do the same to cities like Chernihiv and Zhytomyr. Similarly, the raids conducted north of Kherson raised the possibility that the Russians might attempt the occupation of additional cities, the most important of which was Odessa. [8]
Guided Missiles
The Russian program of guided missile strikes, conducted in parallel to the three ground campaigns, created a number of moral effects favorable to the Russian war effort. The most important of these resulted from the avoidance of collateral damage that resulted, not only from the extraordinary precision of the weapons used, but also from the judicious choice of targets. Thus, Russia’s enemies found it hard to characterize strikes against fuel and ammunition depots, which were necessarily located at some distance from places where civilians lived and worked, as anything other than attacks on military installations.
Likewise, the Russian effort to disrupt traffic on the Ukrainian rail system could have included attacks against the power generating stations that provide electricity to both civilian communities and trains. Such attacks, however, would have resulted in much loss of life among the people working in those plants as well as a great deal of suffering in places deprived of power. Instead, the Russians chose to direct their missiles at traction substations, the remotely located transformers that converted electricity from the general grid into forms used to move trains. [9]
There were times, however, when missile strikes against “dual use” facilities gave the impression that the Russians had, in fact, targeted purely civilian facilities. The most egregious example of such a mistake was the attack, carried out on 1 March 2022, upon the main television tower in Kyiv. Whether or not there was any truth in the Russian claim that the tower had been used for military purposes, the attack on an iconic structure that had long been associated with a purely civilian purpose did much to reduce the advantages achieved by the overall Russian policy of limiting missile strikes to obvious military targets.
The Challenge
The three ground campaigns conducted by the Russians in Ukraine in 2022 owed much to traditional models. At the same time, the program of missile strikes exploited a capability that was nothing short of revolutionary. Whether new or old, however, these component efforts were conducted in a way that demonstrated profound appreciation of all three realms in which wars are waged. That is, the Russians rarely forgot that, in addition to being a physical struggle, war is both a mental contest and a moral argument.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine may mark the start of a new cold war, a “long twilight struggle” comparable to the one that ended with the collapse of the Soviet Empire more than three decades ago. If that is the case, then we will face an adversary who, while drawing much of value from the Soviet military tradition, has been liberated from both the brutality inherent in the legacy of Lenin and the blinders imposed by Marxism. What would be even worse, we may find ourselves fighting disciples of John R. Boyd.
Notes
[1] Headquarters Marine Corps, MCWP 3-43.1, Raid Operations (Washington, DC: 1993).
[2] For the adoption of the concept of the “raid” by the Russian Army of the late nineteenth century, see Karl Kraft von Hohenlobe-Ingelfingem (Neville Lloyd Walford, translator), Letters on Cavalry, (London: E. Stanford, 1893); and Frederick Chenevix Trench, Cavalry in Modern Wars, (London: Keegan, Paul, Trench, and Company, 1884).
[3] For a brief account of the reyd, which was led by Alexander Chernyshev, see Michael Adams, Napoleon and Russia, (London: Bloomsbury, 2006).
[4] John Reed and Polina Ivanova, “Residents of Ukraine’s Fallen Cities Regroup under Russian Occupation,” The Financial Times, (March 2022), available at https://www.ft.com.
[5] David M. Glantz, “Excerpts on Soviet 1938-40 Operations from The History of Warfare, Military Art, and Military Science, a 1977 Textbook of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces,” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, (Milton Park: Routledge, March 1993).
[6] The classic work on the French mutinies of 1917 is Richard M. Watt, Dare Call It Treason, (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1963).
[7] Michael Schwirtz, “Anxiety Grows in Odessa as Russians Advance in Southern Ukraine,” The New York Times, (March 2022), available at https://www.nytimes.com.
[8] Staff, “Russia Bombs Five Railway Stations in Central and Western Ukraine,” The Guardian, (April 2022), available at https://www.the-guardian.com.
[9] For an example of the many stories that characterized the 1 March 2022 television tower strike as an attack on civilian infrastructure, see Abraham Mashie, ”US Air Force Discusses Tactics with Ukrainian Air Force as Russian Advance Stalls,” Air Force Magazine, (March 2022), available at https://www.airforcemag.com.
.
.
SOURCE: www.imetatronink.com
THE END
If you told a so called conservative 20 years ago that today they’d be supporting Russia in a war over the US and voting for Donald Trump, they’d ask to have what you’re having.
Tactics aside as well, the optics of the Ukrainian support in liberated Kherson were terrible and really showed how rigged that 99.8% election results was.
You mean the 19 or so people who came out to greet the Ukrainian troops for a photo op before they retreated to relative safety? Also, I don’t recall any claim of 99.8% in Kherson. Maybe Donetsk or Luhansk.
So I guess Douglas Muarry ( a wimpy academic type) was not actually in Kherson……LOL, you idiots can’t seem to imagine that the Deep Shekel-controlled state of the Western World does actually have the weapons and technology to smoke the weak-ass Russians…..doesn’t make it right….it is just the truth on the ground……Put down your ideological blinders and hatred for the small hats and see the truth. Notice how I always bring the receipts……..tell me this is just another fake (like the moon landing). https://nypost.com/2022/11/18/on-a-visit-to-kherson-i-see-why-the-ukrainians-will-win-with-our-support/
That’s not only fake – it’s faker than shit. Murray is a homosexual. Homosexuals have a greater than normal tendency to dissemble. Disagree if you want – that’s my belief, and I stand by it. I already didn’t like him before I watched today’s lengthy evisceration of him by Gonzalo Lira. Half of Murray’s assertions in that column would already have been obvious bullshit without Lira’s explanation. Murray’s bullshitting cannot be put down to ignorance.
I suppose you still believe it was the Russians who executed civilians in Bucha – when everyone who’s paid attention long since came to realize that it was the Ukrainians who killed them as “collaborators”. The way you can know that’s true is because 1) the Western propaganda machine stopped talking about Bucha and 2) YouTube and the social media companies still censor any/all data or opinion about Bucha and cancel anyone who brings it up.
I knew I should’ve taken that Russian language course in high school.
Poland…reeeee
108th ADA (Air Defense Artillery)
Hurting some feelings right there. Those Murkin G.I.s are going to need some counselling and a binky.
you believe giving shit to us soldiers is empowering? Go fuck yourself. These men are victims, just like the idiot who’s busting these guys balls.
Truth is never not empowering, in any form …Eat a bag of dicks, dumbass.
F U, I’d meet you anywhere…name it, pal. I’m in Florida. Let me know when you’re down here, and I’ll also introduce you to people who have fought for this nation, and DO NOT DESERVE THIS SHIT, but you and me, first.
OK cool. 3859 1st Ave. Smithers, BC.
Ask for Big Dave.
You ain’t “Flush” Dave, but come on down, I’ll accommodate you. You have your gay Premier do deal with, first. But I’m here.
Um,no….
So that would be you coming here then.
Here comes the rationalization…..
Well if he didn’t take the vax he can’t come up. Did you take the vax? You seem to be a f****** blowhard Dave.
But I am the blowhard?
You are a monumental fuckwit.
ha ha ha …meet me @ your momma’s house, jellyboy.
Wow, what a load of downvotes. There sure are some stupid people here.
Indeed. And with you, +1.
Victims?
They signed up. If they signed up knowing what they would be doing, not victims.
If they did not bother to research what they would be doing before signing up, not victims.
Personal responsibility. You should look into it. Clearly it is a foreign concept to you.
I was just following orders.
There is no Draft now so GIs had a choice; with the Genocide Shot required, and all the cultural communist shit, and national policy run by democrats, I wouldn’t join or stay in the regular Military. Buck up GIs, I know service in a hostile foreign country is tough and you want to fuck that guy up but its’ his country, you asked for it per se, you got to take it.
Is he busting their balls or is he at least speaking his mind on what he believes our country has come to stand for? The the last words of his video are the most important: “You are not welcome here.”
These soldiers are not the problem, true, but the people who sent them into this man’s country are not their to give shit. These are not Muslims or Arabs or Somalis saying go the fuck away we don’t want you. These are the people who many Americans are descended from in one of the few countries left that is at least making a token effort to resist the NWO. The lions share of our military are not the problem the policy setters are, but maybe the lions share of our military need to start making their opinions known.
This should have caused a firestorm of soldiers to stand up and demand the accountability even if it ended as it did with this man, being drummed out of the service. If enough soldiers had then this guy would not be busting anyone’s balls in Poland.
To my surprise, I have to agree with capndiesalot. As much as I wish no one would join the US military these days, I can’t expect 18 year olds to understand the perfidiousness of US foreign policy when 90% of 40-60 year olds don’t. And the racist taunts thrown at a black American who’s joined the military after the history of blacks in America isn’t cool. At all.
They should just repeat what their commanders say, “Diversity in the ranks is a force multiplier!” They may be right!
I would have walked back to the guy took his phone and smashed it under my boot heel then I would have given him 10 seconds to get out of my sight.
Speaking of blowhards……
IMO, General MacGregor has been the best analyst–at least the best from the USA–throughout the war. Here’s his latest. Easy to comprehend at 2x speed.
There are several different versions of “Hell March”.
It’s a dated song from the “Command and Conquer” video game series some of us loved to play years ago on PC. If you like Russian-themed martial music, here’s another march tune. I’ve always loved the absolutely beautiful female soprano version from “Red Alert”, even though the lyrics are nonsensical.
I still play RA, mostly in winters when I can’t do much of anything.
a
Auntie loves a hot piece of sexy military propaganda as much as anyone, however, all of you remember that the generals are most always fighting the last war.
That Odessa had not been a primary objective from the outset is strange as is ensuring the people of the capital region were under constant remindering from the beginning of the operation.
You would have to be fucking crazy to enlist in the military today.I know so many guys who served and committed suicide after they came back . I also have family members that were mentally damaged beyond repair.When they are done using you then the govt declares you a domestic terrorist .
I’m on the Terrorist Watch list and I was an Officer; the real stateside terrorist are the SPLC ZOG SOBs making the list, and the Traitors who serve them.
I am no sucker. If you think I’m going to side with Russia, or Ukraine in this war, you’re insane. I side with one nation, and one nation only, OURS. As far as I’m concerned, the two sides between Europe and Asia, DESERVE EACH OTHER…the whole world is corrupt. The corruption in Russia is just as bad as it is in Ukraine, and BOTH take a back place to the “leadership” of the US and China.
Iran? China? Russia? India? Turkey? Show me a SINGLE nation that isn’t led by a bunch of dirtbags. Add the US to the mix, no wonder Musk wants to settle Mars.
These so called leaders are all dirty as fuck. You can take that, along with your russian military porn, to the bank.
AMERICA! RIGHT OR WRONG!!! WE THE BEST!!!!!!!!!! WHOOOOOAAAAAHHHHHH!
You be a brainwashed dick Captain.
BWAAAHAHAHAHAHA….
Carpet bombing nations into rubble… the murikan way… orah
You just told a Thug “I got your back”. I want to get rid of the Thug. Of course, anybody attacking my family and friends has to get through me first.
Captain dies a lot sez:
” If you think I’m going to side with Russia, or Ukraine in this war, you’re insane.”
Yes, Sir!
[youtube
Firesign Theatre, oh how so few of us know of these gems from the 60’s.
Not related to the clip from above one of my favorites (which I use often without attribution is the Department of Redundancy Department.
or
Visit our fresh produce department. Don’t worry about the flies, we don’t weigh ’em.
For me, for artists be they musicians or comedians, I love the original works. In this case their first four albums.
Thanks @Machinist for posting, lots of cool memories (and I have them on CDs now, losing the vinyl years ago).
Lol…what jingoist cesspool did this candieass cuck crawl out of ?
The standard cry of the suckered.
I remember going for forced marches in my time (10 -20 miles, fast pace, loaded with gear, ready for action when we arrived) which made me feel as if we were going through hell.
The real tragedy here is that the soldiers of the Ukraine and Russia are killing each other at the behest of the people pulling the strings from the west. I live in the pacific northwest, and as anyone in the area here can tell you there are pretty significant Russian and Ukrainian populations here. If one were to look for the last vestiges of a white population in the Portland area that was not psychotic, culturally suicidal, lacking piercings tats green hair and a love for the LGBTQ/Black Lives matter bullshit… you would find it in the enclaves of the Ukrainians and Russians that reside here. All I see when I look at this conflict is whites killing whites while the rest of the world looks on and postures about how woke they are.
It is a fucking shame. Almost enough to make me think twice about supporting Russia – until I remember that the people (mostly in America) who gleefully plan to carve up Russia are the same people who push that woke, anti-human crap you see in Portland. They want to stamp out the last bastion of Christendom in Eurasia.
I recall some news douche bag shit talking how the Russian missile or rocket attack was not much of an issue .
Obviously this asshole as never been a target of those no big deal rocket attacks . Explosion deafens you and if you hear one going overhead you get that millisecond of relief while trying to crawl into your helmet .
Other than that it’s a garden party !
These assholes have watched to many Rambo movies where the enemy is bumbling about like babbling idiots
Go Russia. Defeat Evil.